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Investment Opportunities and Barriers

in Japan: The Regulation of
Direct Investment
By TosHINoBu INADA*

I.

INTRODUCTON: FEATURES OF JAPANESE
INDUSTRY AND ITS GROWTH

When considering investment opportunities and barriers to such opportunities in Japan, one must first have some understanding of the historical situation surrounding the development of industry and legal
policy in Japan following World War II.
As a result of the war, Japanese industry in the early postwar years
was virtually destroyed, requiring complete reconstruction. One of the
purposes of the Allied occupation which began in August 1945 was the
formulation of a policy of economic democratization. The Allies dissolved the zaibatsuI and eliminated the previous excessive concentration
of economic power, while simultaneously using the precedent of American law to establish an Antimonopoly Act and a Securities and Exchange
Act within municipal law. The policy of economic democratization also
extended to commercial law and led to the amendment of corporate laws
based on American precedent.
The industrial world experienced some confusion at the time, due to
the change from the previous German-style legal system to a system
styled after American practice, but the changes met the overall approval
of Japanese industry. One factor behind this approval was the expectation that the unification of corporate laws and the extension of identical
treatment to foreign and domestic corporations alike would result in the
influx of foreign capital to Japan.
The expectations of industry were disappointed, however, as the
bulk of American capital flowed to the European continent, and Japanese
industry was instead forced to rebuild by its own independent efforts.
* Professor and Dean, College of Law, Nihon University.
1. The zaibatsu were the giant conglomerate corporations. The four largest prewar
zaibatsu were Mitsubishi, Miteui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda. Following the war, these conglomerates were dissolved and reconstructed after undergoing reformation.
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The Japanese government simultaneously implemented policies for the
promotion of domestic industry, focusing on financial and tax law, thus
extending protection to Japanese industry and nurturing its regrowth.
These were the origins of Japan's policy of industrial. protection.
In the mid-1950s major Japanese companies began forming corporate groups (kigyj shiddan) from the former zaibatsu, centering on banking institutions. Through such horizontal industrial affiliations
(keiretsu), these groups formed linkages which extended mutual aid in
the areas of finance and product manufacturing and distribution. Such
organizations later developed into vertical affiliations as well.
What would have happened had American capital been introduced
to Japan following the amendment of corporate law in the early 1950s?
The Japanese economic structure would likely have become more internationalized, and the Antimonopoly Act, the Securities and Exchange
Act, and corporate laws would have been promulgated and implemented
in forms more closely resembling their American precedents at an earlier
date.
American capital did not flow into Japan. Japamese industry was
rebuilt through a combination of its own efforts and strong government
protection. At the same time-the Antimonopoly Act, the Securities and
Exchange Act, and corporate laws-laws which had been initially
modeled after American precedent, were revised numerous times, and
thus, assumed a form extremely favorable to Japanese corporations.
Currently, Japanese corporations are fully able to compete on a par
with other world businesses, and their activity overseas is nothing short
of remarkable. Under these conditions, the previous protection extended
to domestic corporations can no longer be justified. Free competition has
come to be recognized as the fundamental principle of global economic
life, a fact amply demonstrated by the recent revolutions within the societies of Eastern Europe. How corporations are treated when their economic activity is confined within the borders of a single nation is one
matter, but once those corporations extend their activities to other countries, fair and free competition is possible only when the same conditions
are extended to corporations of all other countries as well.
With this background, I would now like to address investment op2
portunities and barriers with respect to direct investment in Japan.
2. There are problems of taxation of capital gains and disclosur,- for noninvestment corporations associated with international indirect investment. I wish here to narrow the focus of
discussion to the issue of direct investment alone.
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II. BARRIERS TO DIRECT INVESTMENT IN JAPAN
AND PROBLEMS REGARDING ITS LEGAL
REGULATION
A. Methods of and Problems Relating to Foreign Access to the
Japanese Market
There are a variety of methods whereby foreign corporations can
gain access to the Japanese market, but the most direct methods are
probably the establishment of a new subsidiary or joint venture corporation, and capital investment in already existing companies (including
mergers and acquisitions). The establishment of a subsidiary or joint
venture corporation has not resulted in any particular problems between
Japan and other countries. At present, IBM and nearly 3000 other companies are active in Japan as foreign capitalized corporations. In contrast, participation in pre-existing corporations is accompanied by
inevitable stock transfers, resulting in a variety of problems. In particular, the development of business groups and keiretsu through the Japanese custom of mutual shareholdings is said to create barriers not only to
commercial transactions, but to acquisition of securities as well, representing a problematic obstacle to direct investment in Japan.
Barriers to direct investment in Japan can be divided into two types:
(1) problems of formal legal regulations and their application; and (2)
problems of informal legal regulations and their application, and
problems of informal barriers. Problems of legal regulations and their
application have been examined from a variety of perspectives within the
Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks, and the Japanese government has already indicated its willingness to proceed toward the solution
to those problems.
In contrast, while the informal barriers have been a focal topic at the
SII talks, no agreements have been reached regarding a comprehensive
means of removing such barriers. Within this context, the purpose of the
present conference is precisely to broach these types of issues, to raise our
mutual consciousness regarding them, and thereby to hopefully proceed
toward solutions. I want to divide our discussion into the two areas of
problems of legal regulations and their application and problems of informal barriers.
B. Direct Investment in Japan: Problems of Legal Regulations and
Their Application
The problem of legal regulations and their application to direct investment in Japan can be divided into individual areas dealing with the
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Foreign Exchange Control Act, the Antimonopoly Act, the Securities
and Exchange Act, the Commercial Law Act, and various other business
laws. Some of these laws are applied with identical contents to foreign
and Japanese corporations alike, while others are applied differently to
foreign and domestic corporations. Further, the contents or application
of some of the Japanese laws are stricter or more lenient than their
American law counterparts. So long as no logical rationale exists for the
differences in contents and application of such restrictions, the conditions
of investment in the two countries will differ, resulting in unequal treatment and true barriers to direct foreign investment.
1. Foreign Exchange Control Act
The current Foreign Exchange Control Act (and Foreign Exchange
Control Ordinance) provides general regulations which are capable of
broadly restricting direct investment by foreign corporations (article 26
of the Law) and limiting technical cooperation (assumed to be accompanied by capital cooperation-article 25 of the Law).
With respect to direct investment in Japan, these restrictions concern advice regarding changes in or cessation of the investment (assuming the prerequisite of preparatory notification-article 22, paragraph 3
of the Law; article 12 of the Ordinance; and article 20 of the Ministerial
Ordinance); and the granting of permission in the case of technical cooperation (article 25 of the Law).
The existence of these regulations has been discussed at the S11
talks, and the Japanese government has agreed to abolish some of the
regulations within the next Diet session. Those restrictions are to be replaced by new provisions which will be applied only to issues concerning
the preservation of national security and related matters as noted in article 3 of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's
(OECD) Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, and to areas subject to reservations under the same OECD code. Further, serious consideration is to be given to whether items currently subject to reservation
will continue to be so reserved. A concurrent topic will be clarification of
the standards employed in the application of the law. Concepts like "national security" as used within the Foreign Exchange Control Act are of
ambiguous scope, and there is the danger that even greater restrictions
could be placed on direct investment in Japan, depending on how those
concepts are interpreted.
2. Antimonopoly Act
The Antimonopoly Act is aimed at maintaining and preserving the
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competitive order within Japan, and is not specifically designed to restrict direct investment from abroad. Further, the law is applied not only
to foreign corporations, but to Japanese corporations as well. However,
since its enactment, the law has been amended numerous times at the
behest of Japan's industrial world. Consequently, the law itself has gradually lost its clout, and its application has been relatively lenient. A good
deal of disparity has thus arisen between Japan and the United States in
the contents and application of antimonopoly regulations, effectively producing conditions of inequality between the two nations.
3.

Securities and Exchange Act

The most convenient method for foreign corporations to gain access
to Japanese corporations is by purchasing stock (or equity) in an existing
Japanese company. The stock can be purchased through the securities
market, but takeover bids (TOB) are a more effective method. Japan's
takeover bid system is different from that practiced in America, involving
previous notification, shorter term for the takeover bid, and added procedural complexity for foreign corporations. Takeover bids tendered by
foreign corporations are also subject to application of the Foreign Exchange Control Act. Since these differences have been regarded as effective restrictions in takeover bids, the Securities and Exchange Act was
amended on June 15, 1990.
Japanese law has adopted the same five percent rule used in American law with regard to disclosure of large volume shareholdings.
4.

Commercial Law Act

The Commercial Law Act stipulates that articles of incorporation
can be used to restrict the transfer of stock shares (article 204, paragraph
1 of the Law). These stipulations are fundamentally directed toward
small, closely held corporations, and are not provided for listed corporations (see the Initial Listing Requirements of Tokyo Stock Exchange, article 4, item 9; and Continued Listing Requirements of Tokyo Stock
Exchange, article 2, item 9). As a result, such regulations cannot be
called restrictions of direct investment to Japan.
5.

Other Special Laws

The Japan Telegraphic Corporation Law (article 4, paragraph 1)
and the Kokusai Denshin Denwa Corporation Law (article 4, paragraph
1) limit stockholdings to Japanese citizens and Japanese corporations.
Similarly, the Japan Airlines Corporation Law (article 2, paragraph 3)
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limits maximum stockholdings by foreign nationals to one-third of the
total stock, while the Broadcast Act (article 53, paragraph 1) limits maximum stockholdings by foreign nationals to one-fifth the total stock. The
purpose of these restrictions is ostensibly related to "national security,"
but some doubt remains as to whether all of these restrictions can be
interpreted in that way, and some reconsideration is in order.

M.
A.

INFORMAL BARRIERS TO DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN JAPAN

Stockholder Stability and the Closed Nature of Corporate Society

As noted above, legal barriers to direct investment in Japan are being gradually eliminated. However, the SHI talks have shown that even
when foreign corporations wish to use vehicles such as mergers and acquisitions to gain access to the Japanese market, the uniquely closed nature of Japanese corporate society-in particular, customs like mutual
shareholdings-result in informal barriers to such access.
The custom of mutual shareholding is perceived as a means of establishing a stable body of stockholders for a corporation, and is considered
an effective method in the context of corporate groups and keiretsu.3 Accordingly, Japanese corporations have, without exception, used this
method to enhance stockholder stability and increased the number of uncomplaining corporate stockholders.4 As a result, the ratio of corporate
stockholders for listed companies in Japan has, in recent years, risen to
approximately seventy-eight percent.
The primary aim of mutual shareholding as practiced by Japanese
corporations and managers is to strengthen the managerial base through
a stabilization of stockholders. Corporate stockholders raise few waves
regarding dividends and the amount of capital gains. By increasing the
number of such stockholders, it becomes possible fbr the company's
managers to gain the shareholders' confidence, thus stabilizing the posi3. Mutual shareholding is the practice whereby two or more companies, for purposes of
business cooperation or stabilization of corporate management, hold mutual shares of the
other's stock. Several patterns of mutual shareholding exist, but the generally used method is
the third-party share allotment, in which the other company is made the recipient.
In the case of six major corporate groups, the proportion of stoik held by another single
company is approximately one to two percent, but the total stock held by all companies in the
group rises to around ten percent.
4. According to a survey of stock distribution carried out by the National Conference of
Stock Exchanges, the percentages of shares held by different kinds of stockholders in 1989
were: 22.6% by individual investors; 42.3% by financial institutions; 3.7% by investment
trusts; 2.0% by securities companies; 24.8% by business corporations; 0.7% by government
and local public bodies; and 3.9% by foreign nationals.
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tion of the managers themselves. This further makes it possible to implement corporate policy from the perspective of long-term profitability,
thus stabilizing the overall direction of management. Second, capital cooperation between corporations makes it possible to strengthen relationships with companies with which a corporation has cooperative
relationships in other areas of its operation. Third, mutual shareholding
is effective as a means of mutual corporate financing. Finally, the formation of corporate groups and keiretsu facilitates financing and operating
cooperation between companies, allowing use of common brands and
otherwise enhancing a corporation's competitiveness.
As mentioned earlier, the practice of mutual shareholding has its
origin in the immediate postwar period of corporate rebuilding, when it
was looked to and functioned importantly as a means of mutual assistance. At the same time, however, the practice also has a background in
Japan's unique cultural ambiance.
There has been criticism of the practice of mutual shareholding,
even from within Japan.' There is the danger of a "hollowing" of corporate capital; that is, there is a danger of inviting the creation of corporate
capital lacking in substance. This practice may also promote control by
managers uninvolved in actual investment, which in turn may result in a
disregard for the rights of minority stockholders. Mutual shareholding
may lessen the effectiveness of monitoring functions designed to supervise the activities of managers. Further, the reduction of floating stock
may lower the functionality of the securities market and invite interference with securities loans. The long-term holding of stock may lead to a
stagnation or fixation in the amount of corporate capital available. Finally, the formation of corporate groups and keiretsu may impede fair
competition.
The problem of keiretsu has been raised within the SII talks from
the standpoint of the third and sixth points noted above. The Japanese
government is now formulating a number of related policies for study by
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission.
In any case, it cannot be denied that the existence of corporate
groups through the practice of mutual shareholding is an impediment to
direct investment in Japan. Transactions between industrialists against
5. The Corporate Law Act and Antimonopoly Act have put restrictions on the practice
of mutual shareholding. These restrictions can be divided into the three areas: (1) the prohibition of a subsidiary receiving stock of a parent company, Corporate Law Act 211/3; (2) restrictions on the holding and acquisition of stock and the exercise of voting rights, Corporate Law
Act 241, such as the prohibition of financial corporations from holding more than five percent
of issued stock, Antimonopoly Act 11; and (3) disclosure restrictions.
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the background of keiretsu relations which are formed through mutual
shareholding are an obstacle to free competition, resulting in an overall
exclusionary effect with regard to foreign corporations which seek to export to Japan, develop markets, or invest in Japan.
B.

Corporate Acquisitions and Japanese Business Customs

In Japan, there is no resistance to the entry of capital from foreign
corporations. For the last several years, actual performance in the area
of direct investments in Japan show that investments have been virtually
doubling each year.6 Two of the signs most frequently seen on Japanese
streets are those for McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken, and most
gasoline stations are those of Esso (Exxon), Mobil, and other foreigncapitalized companies. There are also a number of foreign corporations
which have been mistakenly thought to be established on Japanese capital.7 In short, there is no resistance to friendly corporate acquisitions,
even when that acquisition is done by foreign corporations, In such
cases, the custom of mutual shareholdings does not represent a barrier to
direct investment in Japan.
There is a strong current of opposition, however, against hostile
takeovers.' This opposition is not limited to such takeovers when conducted by foreign corporations, but by Japanese corporations as well.
The activities of the kaishimeya (a term which has much the same connotation as the English "greenmailer") have long been subject to the same
harsh censure as that directed toward a hijacker. Particularly when acquisitions are made by the method of leveraged buy outs, the excessive
debt required by the purchase, stagnation of repayment, and subsequent
corporate dismemberment and release of employees has caused high degrees of suspicion of and opposition to hostile takeovers. Such opposition is evident not only among Japanese managers and investors, but
among employees and labor unions as well.
6. According to the annual report issued by the Ministry of Finance's International Finance Bureau for 1989, direct foreign investments in Japan over the previous five years had
increased at an annual rate of 200%. The absolute monetary figure of such investments, however, remained only one-tenth the total invested from Japan to the United States; as the final
report of the Structural Impediments Initiative talks indicates, even greater efforts are required
in this area.
7. See FOREIGN AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN JAPAN - A COMPREHENSIVE DIRECTORY
(Tokyo 1989).
8. In a survey of corporate managers conducted by the Nihon keizai shinbun, 70% of
respondents indicated that hostile corporate takeovers were not appropriate within the context
of Japanese culture, customs, and labor management relationships. NIItON KEIZAI SHINBUN,
Sept. 28, 1989.
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In the background to this opposition is a fundamental difference in
the way in which the Japanese view the question "Whose company is it?"
In Europe and the United States, the concept that the corporation belongs to the stockholders is firmly in accord with capitalist principles,
with the result that stockholder profit becomes the standard for corporate decision-making. In contrast, no matter what the theoretical ideal
may be, the reality in Japan is that a consciousness exists to the effect
that the corporation "belongs to a certain community, composed of
stockholders, managers, employees, and even customers." 9 This communal consciousness likely has been fostered as the result of the way in
which corporate executives are produced in Japan. The great majority of
executives in major Japanese corporations rise from the ranks of common employees of the same companies. Even when a person reaches the
position of company director, that person still maintains his status as an
employee of the company. 10 It is natural that such executives retain a
consciousness that the company is an entity which has nurtured them,
and which they themselves have nurtured. Accordingly, the most general standard of corporate decision-making used by corporate managers
is that which springs from the perspective of the profit of the corporation
itself. 1
Evidence of this tendency can be seen for example, in the case of the
recent attempted purchase of the Chiijitsuya and Inageya supermarkets
by the Shuwa Company. In this case, the individual company labor unions of both target corporations issued resolutions against the proposed
purchase, and the Zenaen union association of which they were members
expressed its support for the resolutions. In short, contrary to the situation in Europe and the United States, there is opposition in Japan to the
transfer of corporate ownership through the will of stockholders alone.
While the structure of authority within this so-called "closed" soci9. According to a survey of department chiefs in 100 listed companies conducted by the
Nikkei shinbun, the question "Whose company is it?" was answered by 77% of respondents
with the answer "the employees' "; 65% answered "the managers' "; 59% said "the stockholders' "; 26% responded "the customers;"' and 23% said "society's as a whole." The high figure
given for "the employees" was likely a result of the fact that this survey was directed toward
employees, but the overall pattern of responses indicate a recognition that the company belongs to a certain community, one which includes the company's customers. NIKxCx
SHmNBUN, Apr. 23, 1990.
10. In Japan, company directors may simultaneously be employees; most managing directors without representation rights hold the joint positions of employee and director.
11. According to the survey mentioned supra note 7,77% of those surveyed responded to
the question "What does your corporation emphasize most heavily?" with the answer "accumulation of profits for the purpose of expanding business." This is a clear expression of the
concept that the profit of the corporation itself is serving as the standard of value.
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ety is said to constitute informal barriers to investment, factors internal
to the system itself are beginning to bring about change.
First, the internationalization of the Japanese economy is causing
increased competition among domestic corporations, Forcing companies
into an inevitable fight against time. Specifically, the leisurely development of a given area of business over a long period of time is not feasible
in today's rapidly changing industrial environment. Japanese managers
are being forced to consider corporate acquisitions from the perspective
of more effective management tactics in restructuring.12 In fact, the
number of corporate acquisitions (mergers and transfers of operation) in
Japan is increasing each year. 3 This is evidence that there is no resistance to corporate acquisitions when they are executed in a friendly way.
Second, while corporate investors-particularly insurance companies and other institutional investors-have conventionally been viewed
as stable stockholders supporting the status quo of managerial control,
such investors are now beginning to complain about the low rate of dividend return on their shareholdings. Looking for more effective investments for their capital, they are starting to question corporate
management itself.
Third, as new stock is issued to raise capital, the distribution of that
stock is beginning to be more widely spread, resulting in changes in composition within the ranks of stable stockholders. When new issues are
distributed to previous stable stockholders, a large capital burden is
placed on the recipients, and that cost is increasing.
IV.

PROSPECTS AND FUTURE TOPICS FOR
INVESTMENT IN JAPAN

The preceding has been a discussion of features or Japan's industry
and legal policies. Along with a simple review of historical facts, I have
addressed the issue of legal restrictions and informal barriers (business
customs) placed on direct foreign investment. Legal restrictions on direct investment in Japan have at last begun to be dismantled as the result
12. According to a survey of managers conducted by the Nihon keizai shinbun, 82% of
respondents indicated they considered mergers and acquisitions to be an effective tool in management strategy. NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Sept. 28, 1989.

13. The annual report issued by Japan's Fair Trade Commission in 1989 showed that
1336 notifications of mergers were recorded in 1988, an increase of ten percent over tile prcvious year. Further, statistics for the past five years indicate growth in mergers at an average
annual rate of seven percent. Transfers of operation have the same effects as mergers, and
1028 cases of such transfers were recorded last year, a figure representing 1.5 times the number
of similar cases five years ago.
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of outside pressure from foreign nations. Signs of change are also beginning to appear in these Japanese business customs considered to be informal barriers to investment.
When it comes to the question of whether the Japanese market environment has become an easy one for direct investment by foreign corporations, one must admit that problems still exist. The Securities and
Exchange Act has been amended and takeover bid restrictions have been
revised, but there remains an excess in the corporate holding of stock,
particularly by financial institutions. An increase of floating stock is also
desirable from the perspective of the overall health of the securities
market.
Further, securities companies and banks have recently begun acting
as mediators in corporate merger and acquisition activities with considerable success in that area.14 But legal provisions are still insufficient; once
such provisions are in place, the merger and acquisition market is expected to be more firmly established, resulting in the facilitation of even
more direct investment from foreign countries. At the same time, liberalization of the strict restrictions on corporate mergers is also a matter for
consideration, and a strengthening of stockholder rights is desirable from
the perspective of investor protection. For example, the general Japanese
practice of suppressing profit dividends at a low level and augmenting
them with share dividends cannot be considered a desirable practice from
the investor's standpoint.
Such considerations are necessary in order to remove barriers to direct foreign investment in Japan and enlarge the scope of opportunities.
They are also necessary to give greater global universality to Japanese
corporate society and to modernize Japanese corporate structure. Based
on a recognition of these current conditions, the issue of revising and
reforming the opportunities and barriers to investment from abroad will
be reported on and studied at the next conference.

14. In Japan, a growing level of arbitration in corporate acquisitions is being performed
by so-called city banks, intermediary institutions of securities companies, general trading companies, and foreign securities companies. For more details about this business, see NiKKM
SANGY6 SHINBUN No. 4786.

